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Abstract
We study claim resolution. A claim consists of a global fact and a
local fact. The global fact is observed by the principal and the agent.
The local fact is observed by the agent alone. The agent resolves the
claim; the principal decides whether the agent is more likely wrong
or right. The principal and agent can disagree about the weight to
accord each fact or the overall evidence threshold. The agent cares
whether the principal follows or ignores her advice. We characterize
how the equilibrium varies with the nature of disagreement. Despite
lacking commitment power, we find that the principal grants the agent
decision-making authority over an interval of global facts. Further, we
∗
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find that the principal can better motivate an agent who excessively
weights the local fact than an agent who excessively weights the global
fact. The principal strictly prefers the former to the latter even though
either would make the same number of errors if granted complete
autonomy.

1

Introduction

Judges, legal scholars, and philosophers often disagree about the “method”
by which court should decide cases. In contracts, for example, there
is a long-standing debate between “formalists” and “anti-formalists”
(Corbin, 1965; Scott, 1999; Charny, 1999; Bernstein, 2015). Formalists
believe that the text of the contract should take primacy in establishing the rights and obligations of the parties. The court should thus
rarely consider extrinsic evidence of the parties’ intent, such as trade
usage or oral testimony. Formalists, in short, are wedded to the plain
meaning rule, which states:
[W]hen the provisions in the contract are clear and unambiguous, the court looks only to the four corners’ of the
document in arriving at the intent of the parties. In the
absence of any ambiguity, the contract will be enforced according to its terms because no construction is appropriate.1
Anti-formalists, by contrast, believe the court should dive into the
overall context of the agreement including the manner under which
the parties performed under the contract (as evidence of what they
believed the contract means) and how members of the trade conduct
business. Unlike formalists, anti-formalists place much less weight on
the text of the contract itself. Indeed, one of the most famous antiformalist scholars writes:
[N]o man can determine the meaning of written words by
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merely glueing his eyes within the four corners of a square
paper; to convince that it is men who give meanings to
words and that words in themselves have no meaning; and
to demonstrate that when a judge refuses to consider relevant extrinsic evidence on the ground that the meaning
of written words is to him plain and clear, his decision is
formed by and wholly based upon the completely extrinsic evidence of his own personal education and experience
(Corbin, 1965, p.164).
This same debate extends beyond contracts to statutory and constitutional interpretation. And it reverberates within the law itself.
For example, in the US, the statute governing the sale of goods has a
much more of an anti-formalist bent than the common law of contracts
(Goetz and Scott, 1985, p.274).
Disagreement over method is not limited to the courts. In the
loan context, the literature has debated the agency costs associated
with loan officer discretion and whether loans should be made on hard
information alone or some combination of hard and soft information
(Liberti and Mian, 2009; Godbillon-Camus and Godlewski, 2013; Liberti and Petersen, 2019). In that context, we see the same debate
about method. Loan officers and supervisors might disagree about
how much weight should be accorded to the soft information about
the applicant such as personal connections and trust and how much
to hard information, such as financial wherewithal.
This paper considers the implication of disagreement over method
for judges, loan officers and other actors who disagree about the weight
to be accorded different pieces of evidence. We ask what happens
when: (1) actors in a hierarchy disagree about method as well as
outcomes;(2) the reviewing actor cannot commit to a policy of reversal
and (3) the agent pays a cost when her advice is ignored (i.e., she is
reversed).
In the model, the agent must make a dichotomous decision subject
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to the principal’s subsequent review or oversight. The agent has access
to two pieces of information. Specifically, the agent observes a global
fact and a local fact which bear on the decision. By contrast, the
principal only observes the global fact. In a contract dispute, for
example, the trial judge sees the demeanor of the witness testifying to
the trade usage and the contract text, whereas the appellate court only
sees the text itself. The text of the contract could be ambiguous, for
example, while the witness’s demeanor (and testimony) clearly point
to liability.
In such a setting, the agent and the principal might disagree about
method—the weight to be allocated each piece of evidence. They
might also disagree about outcomes—the sum total of evidence necessary to declare the claim “valid.”
The literature on delegation and cheap talk focuses on this second
source of disagreement (Crawford and Sobel, 1982; Holmstrom, 1984;
Alonso and Matouschek, 2008). The first source of disagreement is,
we believe, more novel.
We first investigate what decisions the principal will reverse and
why. Specifically, how does the reversal decision depend on interaction between the location of the global fact and the source of agency
conflict? Does it matter whether the conflict arises from differences of
opinion over method or differences of opinion over outcomes? And if
so, why?
In the equilibrium where the agent’s decision conveys information
about the local fact, the principal affirms unless the agent’s decision
is both unexpected given the information contained in the global fact
and sufficiently more in line with the agent’s than the principal’s preferences. It is not enough, in other words, for the principal to know
that the agent improperly places a thumb on the scale in favor of valid
decisions. The global fact must also be informative enough on its own
(e.g., it must unambiguously point to invalidity) to allow the principal
to make a credible threat to reverse. That means the principal—who
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has no commitment power—delegates broad swathes of decisions to
the agent who holds different views. In other words, the agent gets his
preferred outcome even though the principal has not given the agent
any real authority.
In fact, the principal often affirms the agent’s decision even when
it is contrary to what the principal would have decided if forced to
do so on her own. The agent has information the principal lacks. By
granting discretion to the agent to decide as she sees fit, the principal
willingly pays the price of the agent deciding some cases in a way the
principal disfavors to leverage the agent’s information for other cases
where the agent and principal share the same goal. In this latter set
of cases, the principal’s decision would misfire if based on the global
fact alone; that is without the benefit of the agent’s knowledge of the
local fact.
We further show that the equilibrium when the principal faces an
agent who overweights the local fact (relative to what the principal
prefers) differs dramatically from the the equilibrium when the agent
underweights the local fact.
Following the law literature, we characterize an agent who overweights the local fact as anti-formalist. The anti-formalist, for example, places too little weight on the contractual text and too much
weight on other harder-to-observe markers of contractual intent. By
contrast, the agent who under-weights the local fact is a formalist.
An anti-formalist agent will, on occasion, decide a case as valid
and other times invalid. She will also trigger scrutiny and face reversal threats for both types of decisions. Formalist agents will also, on
occasion, decide a case as valid and other times decide a case as invalid. Contrasted with anti-formalists, the formalist agent often faces
no reversal threat whatsoever. Further, in circumstances where they
do face a reversal threat, it is only with respect to one type of decision, The principal will (1) always affirm the formalist agent’s valid
decisions or (2) always affirm the agent’s invalid decisions or (3) affirm
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every decision the formalist agent makes.
After characterizing the principal’s review strategy and the agent’s
resolution strategy, the welfare implications of the model are discussed.
Like Gennaioli and Shleifer (2007), our model sits in a two-dimensional
space, consisting of a local fact and a global fact. Preferences are
defined by cutlines in this space. The principal and the agent’s cutlines
have a slope and an intercept. As such, the preference conflict between
the principal and the agent can, as noted, take multiple forms. And
this innovation reveals a new trade-off in the selection of agents. The
anti-formalist agent – because she faces a credible threat of reversal in
more cases – is easier to motivate than agents exhibiting any other type
of preference conflict. Because of this, the principal strictly prefers the
anti-formalist agent, even if that agent’s preferences are less congruent
with his own than other agents he might select. This result stands in
contrast to the ally principle touted in the political science that states
“[i]f the boss delegates, then she picks the agent whose ideal point is
the closest to hers” (Bendor et al., 2001, p.243).
In short, not all differences of opinion between the agent and the
principal matter in the same way. The principal can effectively manage
some preference conflicts—specifically regarding an agent’s tendency
to overweight local facts—better than others.
The welfare implications of the model speak directly to the type of
front line loan officer a bank should hire. The bank should prefer an
agent who cares more deeply about soft information than the principal
does even if that agent disagrees more with the supervisor than other
potential hires.
What about judges? Of course, unlike a supervisor of loan officers,
the appellate court does not pick the trial court judges in the federal
system. Nonetheless, the model surfaces new trade-offs in the appointment process. Take a president looking to appoint a new judge.
Assume he cannot get his first best choice through the Senate confirmation process. The model shows that a judge’s philosophy matters
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in different ways depending on the place the judge sits in the judicial hierarchy. Anti-formalist trial court judges, in general, have less
power over the ultimate resolution of cases. Formalist trial judges, by
contrast, provide little useful information when they resolve cases and
rarely face reversal threats. The president, thus, might pick an antiformalist nominee to the trial court level with whom he substantially
disagrees over a formalist nominee whose preferences are more congruent with his own. That same trade-off does not appear for Supreme
Court justices or circuit court appointees.
Finally, our model bears on the value of commitment in matters
of claim resolution. In claim resolution, the principal seeks to minimize findings of validity where she prefers invalidity and findings of
invalidity where the principal prefers validity. The number of correct
answers is irrelevant.
This preference feature dampens the value of commitment. Indeed,
we find that the principal has the same payoff whether she can commit
to delegate to the agent certain classes of decisions or must engage in
ex post reversal after observing the agent’s decision. While the agent
reacts differently in these two settings, those differences do not change
the overall number of mistakes made in equilibrium. Instead, it shifts
the composition as between the type types of mistakes.
The paper unfolds as follows. A review of the related literature
follows immediately. Section 2 sets up the model. Section 3 characterizes the equilibrium of the model. Section 4 provides the welfare
and value of commitment results. Section 5 discusses in detail the
relationship between our model and other canonical models in the literature. Section 6 provides a short conclusion. All proofs not in the
text can be found in the appendix.
Related Literature:
First, the model builds off past work examining the interactions
between appellate courts and trial courts. Cameron et al. (2000), for
example, looks at the Supreme Court’s decision whether to grant cer-
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tiorari and thereafter overrule an appellate court decision. In that
model, the Supreme Court and lower court can only disagree along
one-dimension: the threshold of proof. The model thus cannot explore implications of method disagreement among judges, which is
our focus.2
We share a two-dimensional case space model with other prior work
in the courts literature. That said, we ask substantially different questions. For instance, Gennaioli and Shleifer (2007) examine the welfare
gains when a judge “distinguishes” a prior precedent. The core insight
is that distinguishing improves the efficiency of the judge-made law.
By contrast, we ask about the ability of trial courts to communicate
information to appellate courts through their resolutions. Lax (2012)
asks whether the appellate court should craft a rule or a standard
when facing a potentially hostile lower court. Our appellate court
cannot commit to an ex ante legal rule or standard. Instead, it must
react to the decision of the trial court. Again, the issue is about communication from a trial court to the appellate court. Finally, Bueno de
Mesquita and Stephenson (2002) focuses on communication from the
appellate court to the trial court. The issue they study is this: when
should an appellate court judge break with precedent rather than refine it? Breaking with precedent leads to a less informed decision by
the trial court (she ignores all the prior precedent signals set by the
past appellate court judges), but can lead to a decision closer to the
writing judge’s ideal point. In that model, the trial court is assumed
to be a faithful agent; as such it neglects the central tension in our
model.
Second, our work uses as a scaffold the classic model of Crawford
and Sobel (1982). We pivot from the core assumptions of that model
in a few ways. One, as this is a model of claim resolution, the agent’s
message space and principal’s action space are restricted. The agent
can only send a valid or invalid message. The principal is restricted to
accept or reverse the agent’s recommendation. In equilibrium, for any
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given global fact, the agent slices the space of local facts into two sets:
local facts that signal validity and local facts that signal invalidity.
Furthermore, the relative size of these sets differ in intuitive ways
with the location of the global fact. For example, if the global fact
suggests invalidity is the proper action, the agent must partition to
ensure that the set of local facts pointing to validity is smaller than
the set of local facts pointing to invalidity.
Finally, we find that the agent’s partition leads the principal to
adopt the agent’s preferred outcome when the global fact is sufficiently
uninformative or the conflict between the principal and agent is sufficiently small. In the cheap talk model, by contrast, the principal never
takes the exact action that the agent prefers. In this way, our model
extends the results of the delegation literature where the agent obtains
his desired outcome over some interval (Holmstrom, 1984; Manuel and
Bagwell, 2013) to a class of problems where the principal lacks commitment power.
Third, we extend the literature that identifies the benefits and costs
of preference conflict between a principal and an agent. For example,
Che and Kartik (2009) explore what happens when the agent carries
different priors from the principal. The authors show that this agent
will often work harder to find information as a result, and, therefore,
can be of greater value to the principal. This same theme arises in
Aghion and Tirole (1997) as to the allocation of formal versus real
authority in organization, Dewatripont and Tirole (1999) as to the
benefits of advocacy, and Gennaioli and Shleifer (2007) on the value
of polarization in a judiciary.
Our agent does not exert effort. Instead, the principal’s reversal
threat motivates certain agents more than others. The threat is more
effective with an agent who holds a specific type of preference conflict:
when the agent is both antiformalist (weights the local fact too much)
and, on average across all claims, equally likely to make a mistaken
finding of validity or a mistaken finding of invalidity.
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2

The Model

The model involves a principal and an agent. In our motivating courts
example, the principal is the appellate court and the trial court is the
agent. In the banking example, the principal is the supervisor and the
agent is the front-line loan officer.
At the start of the game, the agent is presented with a “claim.”
A claim consists of two facts: a global fact x and a local fact y. The
global fact is observable to both the principal and the agent. The local
fact is private information, observable only by the agent.
The global fact and the local fact are randomly drawn from independent, uniform distributions with support on [0, 1]. The space of
the possible claims is thus the unit square.
When presented with a claim, the agent decides whether to find the
claim valid (“1”) or invalid (“0”). The agent’s strategy is a function
d = ∆(x, y) specifying for each possible claim whether she will decide
the claim as valid.
The principal observes the agent’s decision and the global fact.
Based on these two pieces of information, the principal must decide
whether to reverse (“1”), affirm (“0”), or mix between the two actions.
The principal’s strategy is thus a function γ = g(d, x) which specifies
the probability of reversal for each possible agent decision and location
of the global fact.
Together the decisions by the principal and agent yield a final
resolution of the claim r = ρ(d, γ), where
ρ(d, γ) = γ(1 − d) + (1 − γ)d.
The principal and the agent care about the final resolution. In addition, as noted in the introduction, the agent cares about reversal—an
aspect of her utility we discuss in a moment.
Cutlines partition the space of claims into ones that the agent or
principal prefers to find valid and ones that they prefer to find invalid.
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The principal’s partition is
x y
1
+ = .
2 2
2
The principal equally weights the local and global facts in any decision.
Moreover, the weighted sum of the evidence must exceed

1
2

for the

principal to prefer validity. Rearranging, the principal divides the
claim space with a cutline of y = 1−x. She prefers validity if y ≥ 1−x
and invalidity if y < 1 − x. By contrast, the agent’s partition is
wx + (1 − w)y = z
where 0 < w < 1 is the weight accorded the global fact and 0 < z < 1
is the total amount of evidence the agent needs to find validity. With
these parameters, the agent’s cutline is
f (x) =

wx
z
−
.
1−w 1−w

The agent prefers validity if y ≥ f (x) and invalidity if y < f (x).
The agent and principal might disagree about method—the weight
w to accord local versus global facts—or the threshold of evidence z
needed to impose liability: i.e., the burden of proof.
On the one hand, the agent might be more of anti-formalist than
the principal (w < 1/2). Such an agent cares too deeply about the
local fact, like oral testimony by the parties. On the other hand, the
agent might be more of a formalist than the principal (w > 1/2). This
agent, for example, places too much import on the text of the contract
than the principal would prefer. And, of course, anti-formalist and
formalist agents can disagree more or less as to the burden of proof to
deploy: that is, they can be lax or strict.
Figure 1 depicts the cutlines for the principal and the agent where
the agent is an anti-formalist (w < 12 ) and strict (z > 21 ). The blue
line is the principal’s cutline, the green line is the agent’s cutline, and
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Figure 1: Principal-Agent Preference Conflict
y
II

z
1−w

III
1 − xc I

1 − xc

II

z−w
1−w

I

IV
I

0

1−w−z
1−2w

z
1−w

−

wz
1−w

y = 1 − x (Principal’s Cutline)
III Agent Prefers Valid
Principal Prefers Invalid

x
marks the global fact where the principal and agent’s

cutlines cross. In the areas marked as I or II, the principal and agent
agree on the disposition (invalid in areas marked as I; valid in areas
marked as II). Areas III and IV measure the degree of disagreement
between the principal and the agent. In area III, the agent prefers the
case be found valid where the principal prefers invalidity. In area IV,
the principal prefers validity and the agent prefers invalidity.
The sum of areas III and IV indexes the amount of disagreement
between the principal and the agent. Area III can be computed by
subtracting the small right triangle from the larger right triangle; that
is,

xc  z
x2c
−
− (1 − xc )
2
2 1−w

xc 
z
=
xc −
+ 1 − xc
2
1−w
xc  1 − w − z 
=
2
1−w
(1 − w − z)2
,
=
2(1 − 2w)(1 − w)

Area(III) =

using that xc =

1−w−z
1−2w .

(Agent’s Cutline)

IV Agent Prefers Invalid
Principal Prefers Valid

xc

xc =

f (x) =

Likewise, Area IV can be computed by sub-
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tracting the smaller right triangle from the larger one.
(1 − xc )2 1 − xc 
z − w
−
(1 − xc −
2
2
1−w
 1 − x 
z − w
c
1 − xc − (1 − xc ) +
=
2
1−w
(z − w)2
=
,
2(1 − 2w)(1 − w)

Area(IV ) =

using that 1 − xc =

z−w
1−2w .

Eventually, in section 4, the analysis will

turn to the principal choosing among similarly situated agents where
“similar” agents present the same amount of disagreement. That
choice reveals insights about the relative costs and benefits of different
ways an agent might disagree with the principal.
Each player suffers a loss of 1 from an error in claim resolution.
The error might be a mistaken finding of validity or a mistaken finding
of invalidity. Because they have different cutlines, the players disagree
about what counts as an error.
The principal’s payoff is
Up (x, y, r) = −r1y<1−x − (1 − r)(1 − 1y<1−x ),
where 1 is an indicator function. Suppose that y < 1 − x and, thus
the principal prefers the claim be decided as invalid. If the claim is
resolved as valid (r = 1) the principal suffers from a mistaken resolution. On the other hand, if the claim is decided as invalid, no mistake
is made and the principal suffers no loss.
The agent’s payoff is the sum of her loss from mistakes in the final
resolution and the loss in the event she is reversed. The reversal loss
is


ky
if d = 0
c(y, d) =
k × (1 − y) if d = 1

where k is a constant. We offer the following interpretation to justify
this loss from reversal.
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• Reduced Form for Reputational Harm. Reversal might
hurt the agent because other actors—future employers or, perhaps with our courts example, the US Supreme Court –see the
reversal and think the agent is incompetent. As the clarity of the
evidence for, say, a valid resolution increases, we suspect that the
agent will have an easier time convincing a third party that she
was correct and the principal was incorrect. The result blunts
the stigma of reversal. This might happen if the agent could
produce a signal for third parties correlated with the local fact
to explain why the principal was wrong to reverse.3
Given this reversal cost, the agent’s payoff is
Ua (x, y, r, d, γ) = −r1y<f (x) − (1 − r)(1 − 1y<f (x) ) − γc(y, d).
The parameters of the payoff functions, the location of the global
fact, and the distributions from which the claims arise are common
knowledge. The only thing the agent knows that the principal does
not is the location of the local fact.
The framework is expansive enough to allow for multiple kinds of
agency conflict. The conflict can arise out of differences of opinion
as to method, the threshold of proof, or both. Table 1 presents the
possible agency conflicts:

Lax

Strict

Agree on Burden

Anti-Formalist

w < 12 , z <

1
2

w < 12 , z >

1
2

w < 12 , z =

1
2

Formalist

w > 12 , z <

1
2

w > 12 , z >

1
2

w > 12 , z =

1
2

1
,
2

1
2

1
,
2

1
2

w = 12 , z = 12
(No Conflict)

Agree on Method w =

z<

w=

z>

Table 1: Possible Sources of Agency Conflict
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Let b(y|d, x) be the principal’s posterior belief about the location of y
given the agent’s decision d and the global fact x. A perfect Bayesian
equilibrium consists of a vector of strategies, (∆? , g ? ), and posterior
beliefs, b? , such that:
1. For each claim, given beliefs b? (·) the principal’s reversal policy,
g ? (·), solves
Z
max
γ

1

Up (x, y, ρ(d, γ))b? (y|d, x)dy

0

2. For each claim, given g ? the agent’s decision policy ∆? (·) solves:
max Ua (x, y, ρ(d, γ ? ), d, g ? (x, d)))
d

.
3. On the equilibrium path, and, to the extent possible, off the
equilibrium path, the principal’s beliefs, b? , are formed according
to Bayes’ Rule.
In a perfect Bayesian equilibrium, the agent resolves the claim optimally given the equilibrium reversal strategy of the principal. The
principal reverses when doing so maximizes her expected utility given
her posterior beliefs about y. Finally, the principal’s posterior beliefs
are derived from the agent’s equilibrium strategy using Bayes’ rule.
Following real world claim resolution practice (e.g., appellate review of trial courts), we view this game as one where the agent resolves
the claim and the principal must decide whether to reverse or affirm.
Alternatively, the game can be seen as a cheap talk game where the
agent sends one of two messages (valid or invalid). That is to say, the
agent makes a recommendation to the principal as to how the claim
should be resolved. The principal can follow the recommendation or
not. The agent’s recommendation is costless (all that matters for
payoffs is the ultimate resolution imposed by the principal), but the
agent suffers a reputational loss when her advice is ignored.
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3

Equilibrium

We focus on the equilibrium where the agent’s decision conveys information to the principal about the location of the local fact.4 The
principal and agent’s preferences are partially aligned; that is, there
will be a set of cases where the principal and agent agree on the outcome. The trouble is that the agent’s resolution of the claim sends a
noisy signal about the location of the local fact. It might be a claim
where the principal and agent agree or it might be a claim where the
principal and agent disagree. The size of these two sets depends on
the location of the global fact and the agent’s equilibrium strategy.
In doing the analysis, it is fruitful to separate formalist agents
(w > 12 ) from anti-formalist agents and those agents that agree with
principal on method (w ≤ 21 ). Why? A geometric insight provides the
answer.
For any global fact, the agent’s cutline might lie below, above or
equal to the principal’s cutline. As figure 2 illustrates, for the antiformalist agent, the cutline will lie below the principal’s to the left
of where the the principal and agent’s cutlines cross. For a formalist agent, the opposite is true. And this difference matters for the
equilibrium.
In the figure, the black area represents cases where the agent
prefers valid and the principal prefers invalid, whereas the orange
area represents cases where the agent prefers invalid and the principal
prefers valid.
Imagine that the global fact is 0. The principal observes this global
fact. She also knows the preferences of the agent. Notably, for a case
with a global fact of 0, the anti-formalist might draw a local fact
where she prefers validity and the principal does not (a case in the
black area at x = 0). By contrast, at x = 0 the formalist agent will
never draw a local fact where she prefers validity and the principal
does not. Instead, the only potential conflict arises if the formalist
agent draws a local fact where she prefers invalidity and the principal
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Figure 2: Preference Conflicts
Anti-Formalist

Formalist

y

y

1 − xc

1 − xc

0

xc

0

x

Agent prefers validity

xc

Agent’s Cutline

Principal prefers invalidity
Agent prefers invalidity

Principal’s Cutline

Principal prefers validity

prefers validity (a case in the orange area).
If x = 0, the principal can credibly threaten to reverse valid decisions by the agent. After all, the principal knows that her own
preference is for invalidity when x = 0. By contrast, the principal,
cannot credibly threaten to reverse invalid decisions. The reason is
that the global fact favors invalidity.
As a result of the principal’s inability to make a credible threat
with respect to invalid resolutions, the formalist agent gets her preferred resolution when the global fact is located at 0. By contrast,
the principal can lodge a credible threat of reversal against the antiformalist agent for this same global fact. This difference in the credibility of threats of reversal implies that formalist and anti-formalists
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x

exhibit divergent kinds of behavior in equilibrium, which we explore
more fully below.

A.

Anti-Formalist Agents And Agents Who

Agree on Method
Consider first what happens when an anti-formalist agent wants to
find more claims valid than the principal. Specifically, the global fact
is less than xc and thus the potential conflict involves the black area
in Figure 2.
Assume the agent decides according to her cutline: she finds the
claim valid (d = 1) when y ≥ f (x) and invalid otherwise. Following
a valid resolution, the principal believes the local fact is distributed
uniformly with a support [max{0, f (x)}, 1]. The max function takes
account that the agent’s cutline might lie below 0. If it does, the valid
decision by the agent deciding according to her cutline provides no
information to the principal. The principal continues to believe the
local fact is distributed uniformly on [0, 1].5
If the principal affirms the agent’s valid decision, the final resolution is valid (r = 1). Now we know that

−1
Up (x, y, 1) =
0

if y < 1 − x
otherwise.

Accounting for the principal’s updated beliefs about y, her expected
payoff from affirming the agent’s valid decision is
R 1−x

R1

max{0,f (x)} Up (x, y, 1)dy

pr(valid)

=−

max{0,f (x)} dy

+

R1

1−x 0dy

pr(valid)
1 − x − max{0, f (x)}
=−
.
pr(valid)

.

(1)

If instead the principal reverses the agent’s valid decision, the final
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resolution is invalid (r = 0). We know that

0
Up (x, y, 0) =
−1

if y < 1 − x
otherwise.

Therefore, the principal’s expected payoff from reversing is
R1

max{0,f (x)} Up (x, y, 0)dy

pr(valid)

R 1−x
=−

max{0,f (x)} 0dy

+

R1

1−x dy

pr(valid)
x
=−
.
pr(valid)

(2)

The principal affirms a valid decision if (1) exceeds (2). If x = 0,
the principal’s loss from reversing a valid decision is 0, and thus she
would certainly do so. With that in mind, we can locate the smallest
global fact where the principal prefers to affirm a valid decision by the
agent, while still recognizing that any valid final resolution comports
perfectly with what the agent desires. That value is determined by
R1

R1

max{0,f (x)} Up (x, y, 1)dy

max{0,f (x)} Up (x, y, 0)dy

−

pr(valid)

pr(valid)

= 0.

or,
−

1 − x − max{0, f (x)}
x
+
= 0.
pr(valid)
pr(valid)

After plugging in f (x) =

z
1−w

−

wx
1−w

(3)

solve (3) for x. The solution

marks a lower bound on the global fact,
x = min

n1 1 − w − z o
,
.
2 2 − 3w

(4)

If x ≥ x, the global fact does not contain enough evidence of invalidity
for the principal to credibly threaten reversal of a valid decision. The
agent takes advantage of this informational deficiency to disregard the
principal’s preferences entirely.
What happens when x < x? If the agent decided every case as she
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preferred, the principal would reverse valid resolutions. But then the
agent would want to deviate to avoid the reversal cost. In this circumstance, the equilibrium strategy for the principal involves mixing
between affirming and reversing a valid decision by the agent. On the
other hand, the agent’s strategy is a cutoff point y ? .
Specifically, the agent finds the claim valid if y ≥ y ? and invalid
otherwise. The point y ? lies in the interval (f (x), 1 − x). Intuitively,
the agent moderates her behavior to find more claims invalid than she
wants to. But she does not perfectly follow the principal’s cutline.
The principal understands the agent’s cutoff point. Indeed, that
point partitions the space of local facts as between valid and invalid
resolutions in a particular fashion. Given the agent’s cutoff point, it
must be that the principal is equally likely to make a mistake when
she affirms and when she reverses a valid resolution. If that is true, the
principal is willing to mix. The probability of reversal, then, induces
the agent to select that point.
After observing a valid resolution, the principal believes that the
local fact is uniformly distributed on [y ? , 1]. Given these beliefs, the
difference in the principal’s expected payoff from affirming and reversing is
R1

y?

Up (x, y, 1)dy
pr(valid)

R1
−

y?

Up (x, y, 0)dy
pr(valid)

R 1−x
=−

y?

dy

pr(valid)

R1
+

1−x dy

pr(valid)

To induce mixing, the equilibrium strategy of the agent, y ? must make
the principal indifferent. Or
−

1 − x − y?
x
+
=0
pr(valid)
pr(valid)

(5)

Observe the solution to (5) is y ? (x) = 1 − 2x, which we now write as a
function of x to make plain that the agent’s equilibrium cutoff point
changes with the global fact.
Next the agent must be willing to play this cutoff point, given the
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reversal probability γ. As noted, the only agents who might decide
the case as valid are those who draw local facts above their cutline,
that is in the interval [f (x), 1]. Such an agent has two choices. First,
they might decide the case as invalid and be affirmed for sure. If they
do so, they suffer a loss of 1. Alternatively, the agent might decide the
claim as valid and hope to be affirmed. This course of action results
in a loss γ × (1 + k(1 − y)). Set these two values equal to locate the
indifferent agent type.
−1 + γ × [1 + k(1 − y)] = 0

(6)

Plug in y ? (x) = 1 − 2x into (6) and solve for γ. The solution identifies
the principal’s mixing strategy, γ ? = g ? (x, 1) =

1
1+2xk .

Finally, the agent suffers a lower cost of reversal as she becomes
more confident in the correctness of her decision. That means the
agent prefers validity for local facts above y ? and invalidity for local
facts below y ? .
To sum up, equation (3) defines a marker between global facts with
complete deference to a valid decisions by the agent and cases where
the principal can make a credible reversal threat. The joint solution to
(5) and (6) identifies the equilibrium behavior (y ? , γ ? ) for cases with
global facts less than x.
Now take a global fact where the anti-formalist agent prefers to
find more claims invalid than the principal, the orange area in figure
2. Again, there will be a range of global facts where the information
content of the global fact is too weak for the principal to effectively
threaten reversal even if she knows the agent is acting solely in her
own private interest.
Suppose, as before, the agent decides all cases as she prefers. Following an invalid decision by the agent, the principal believes the local
fact is distributed on the interval [0, min{f (x), 1}]. The principal’s
payoff to affirming the invalid decision and having a final resolution
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of invalid (r = 0) is
R min{1,f (x)}
dy
Up (x, y, 0)dy
= − 1−x
pr(invalid)
pr(invalid)
min{1, f (x)} − (1 − x)
=−
.
pr(invalid)

R min{f (x),1}
0

(7)

If the principal reverses an invalid decision by the agent, the final resolution is valid (r = 1). The resulting expected payoff to the principal
is
R 1−x
dy
Up (x, y, 1)dy
=− 0
pr(invalid)
pr(invalid
1−x
=−
.
pr(invalid)

R min{f (x),1}
0

(8)

The principal will affirm the agent’s invalid decision if (7) exceeds
(8). We can thus define the largest value of x where the principal will
affirm an invalid decision by an agent who decides all cases according
to her own cutline. That value occurs when
−

1−x
min{1, f (x)} − (1 − x)}
+
= 0,
pr(invalid)
pr(invalid)

(9)

from which we solve for an upper bound.
x = max

n 1 2 − z − 2w o
,
2
2 − 3w

(10)

If x ≤ x, the principal affirms any invalid resolution. If x > x, the
equilibrium involves mixing by the principal and a cutoff point by the
agent.
For these cases, suppose the agent plays a cutoff point, y ? , which
is larger than 1 − x. The difference in the principal’s payoff from
affirming and reversing an invalid agent decision is
R y?
R 1−x
Up (x, y, 1)dy
dy
1−x dy
=−
+ 0
pr(invalid)
pr(invalid) pr(invalid

R y?

R y?

0

0

Up (x, y, 0)dy
−
pr(invalid)
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For the principal to mix, she must be indifferent given the agent’s
cutoff point strategy, y ? . Meaning
−

1−x
y? − 1 − x
+
= 0.
pr(invalid) pr(invalid)

(11)

Likewise, the agent must be willing to play the cutoff point y ? given
the reversal probability, γ. The agent finds it optimal to play this
strategy when
−1 + γ × [1 + ky ? ] = 0

(12)

For claims with global facts above x, the joint solution (y ? , γ ? ) to (11)
and (12) identifies the equilibrium. The first proposition summarizes
formally the discussion thus far.
Proposition 1. If w ≤
the triple

(∆? , g ? , b? )

•

1
2,

there exists an equilibrium consisting of

such that:

1
?
∆ (x, y) =
0

where
?

y (x) =

•
γ ? = g ? (x, d) =

if y > y ? (x)
if y ≤ y ? (x).




1 − 2x


f (x)



2(1 − x)

1



 1+2xk
1

1+2k−2kx



0

if x ∈ [0, x)
if x ∈ [x, x]
if x ∈ (x, 1].

if x < x and d = 1
if x > x and d = 0
otherwise.

• Beliefs about y are uniform with support [0, min{y ? (x), 1}] if the
decision is invalid and support [max{y ? (x), 0}, 1] if the decision
is valid.
Proof. The proof follows by solving (3) and (9) for x and x. The joint
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solution to (5) and (6) define the equilibrium for cases with global
facts less than x. Next the joint solution to (11) and (12) defines the
equilibrium for global facts greater than x. Finally, given y ? (x), it is
clear that the principal prefers to affirm all invalid resolutions below
x and all valid resolutions above x.
Two examples illustrate the insights from proposition 1.
Example 1 (Pure Anti-Formalist).
Suppose that w = 0 and z = 12 . This agent agrees with the principal
that half of the claims should be held valid and half invalid. But the
agent disagrees as to the method. She thinks the global fact should be
ignored. As a result, ex ante the agent and principal disagree about
the resolution in

1
4

of the claims.

Plugging this agent’s parameter values into (4) and (10) provides
the markers on the interval of discretion. Specifically, the upper and
lower bounds on the global facts are
1
4
3
x= .
4
x=

Outside these bounds, the principal mixes when the agent makes an
unexpected decision (i.e., a decision that goes against what the global
fact suggests is the right decision). The agent’s cutoff point is set to
provoke the principal’s indifference.
Figure 3 illustrates the preference conflict and equilibrium strategies for the agent and the principal. To draw this figure and all the
remaining ones, we set k = 1.
Between the markers x and x, the principal affirms all decisions.
Below x, the principal affirms invalid decisions and reverses valid decisions with positive probability. The principal does so because the
global fact is small and, therefore, counter to the agent’s resolution.
As the global fact approaches 0, the principal reverses valid decisions
with greater frequency.
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Figure 3: Pure Anti-Formalist
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g(x, 0)

1

0

1
x

x

x

Principal’s Reversal Strategy
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x

Likewise, for cases with global facts above x, the principal affirms
all valid resolutions and reverses invalid resolutions with positive probability. Notably, the jump in the reversal probability at x and x arises
because of the nature of the payoffs. The agent’s loss from a mistaken
resolution is a fixed cost of 1. To induce an agent who realizes a local
fact above his cutline to choose invalidity and suffer a loss for sure
rather select validity and suffer a loss with some probability demands
a large reversal probability punch.
Example 2 (Agent Disagrees About Burden Alone).
Suppose that w =

1
2

√

and z =

2
4 .

The preference conflict and equi-

librium strategies appear in figure 4. Like the pure anti-formalist, in
this setting, the agent and principal disagree about the resolution in

1
4

of all cases.
Use these parameters and (4) and (10) to obtain the bounds on the
global facts
√
2− 2
x=
≈ .29
2√
4− 2
x=
≈ 1.29
2
Because the upper bound exceeds 1, the principal defers to all invalid
decisions made by this agent, meaning g(x, 0) = 0 for all x. This
makes sense. Whenever the agent prefers an invalid resolution the
principal does too. As a result, the agent only faces a reversal threat
with respect to valid decisions. And in fact below x, the agent and
principal’s behavior mirror the equilibrium behavior of example 1.
Proposition 1 offers four lessons. First, in many cases, the principal
defers to every decision the agent makes. And this happens despite
the principal’s inability to commit to do so and the fact that the global
fact points against the agent’s decision. Meaning, the principal would
have decided differently if she had to make the call on her own.
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Figure 4: Threshold Disagreement
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x

The model thus sheds light on the instructions among judges at
different levels of a hierarchy. According to the U.S. Supreme Court,
If the district court’s account of the evidence is plausible
in light of the record viewed in its entirety, the court of
appeals may not reverse it even though convinced that had
it been sitting as the trier of fact, it would have weighed the
evidence differently. Anderson v. City of Bessemer City,
N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 573–74 (1985).
Appellate courts are not to reverse, even if they would have decided
the case differently. How is that commitment possible? This longstanding practice arises in our model: the global fact is inconsistent
with the district court decision, and yet the appellate court affirms.
The key is that the appellate court trades off the agent’s informational
advantage against the potential preference conflict. For certain cases,
the appellate court infers that the trial court was more likely right
than wrong in spite of observing that the trial court ruled contrary to
the weight of the global fact: the text of the contract, for instance.
Second, appellate courts are often instructed to affirm unless the
trial court decision is clearly erroneous. In this model, we see an
arguable—and indeed subtle—difference between clear errors and runof-the-mill errors by trial courts. A naive way to characterize error
is when a trial court decision goes against the weight of the publicly
available information. Our model demonstrates that the appellate
court understands that this does not necessarily mean the trial court’s
made a mistake. Indeed in many cases, the appellate court believes
the trial court’s decision is more likely right than wrong, even though
the appellate court would have decided differently if forced to do so
on the global fact. Outside the bounds of discretion, the trial court
moderates its behavior so that the principal believes the trial court’s
decision equally likely to be right or wrong.
Yet in reversing the appellate court has access to a piece of information to justify its decision. The appellate court can report in the
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opinion that the trial court was clearly erroneous. Why? The appellate court can point to the fact that the global fact presented strong
evidence of, say, validity while the trial court found the claim invalid.
Interestingly, the appellate court can make that statement, knowing
that the trial court’s decision is, in equilibrium, equally likely to be
right or wrong.
Third, the agents described in the two examples disagree ex ante
with the principal in the same percentage of the cases. Yet the principal can lodge a credible reversal threat in more cases against the
anti-formalist agent. This suggests, and we will confirm in the welfare
section, that the principal strictly prefers the anti-formalist agent even
when this agent’s preferences are less aligned with the principal’s than
other potential agents.
Fourth, the model predicts that some agents will face two bounds
on permissible behavior, while others will face only one. Return here
to our motivating example of the front line loan officer. Suppose she
weighs local facts more heavily than her superior, but is neither biased
in favor nor against granting a loan. Such an agent will face supervisor
scrutiny as to the improper grant of loans and the improper denial
of loans. That is to say, the denial of a loan to an applicant who
has a strong credit score will trigger supervisor review and potential
reversal. Likewise, the grant of a loan to an applicant with a weak
credit scores will trigger review and potential reversal. By contrast, if
the loan officer simply has a tendency to grant too many applications,
the supervisor will only scrutinize the grant of loans to applicants with
weak credit scores.

B.

The Formalist Agent: w >

1
2

Having considering the anti-formalist and agents that agree on method,
we next turn to the formalist agent. As noted, the formalist agent’s
cutline will lie below the principal’s to the right of where they cross
and above to the left. First focus on what happens when the agent’s
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cutline lies below the principal’s; that is, the agent prefers to find more
claims valid than the principal.
Suppose the agent does not moderate her behavior. The principal’s
payoff to affirming a valid decision is (1). The payoff to reversing is
(2). The payoff to affirming exceeds the payoff to reversing in two
cases:
x>

1
or f (x) ∈ [1 − 2x, 1 − x]
2

As shown in Figure 2, from the principal’s perspective, the formalist agent finds too many claims valid as the global fact increases.
If x >

1
2,

the principal lacks the evidence to reverse such a finding

and thus affirms. If x <

1
2

a valid finding becomes suspect. But

there is a competing consideration: the agent’s preferences might be
in tune with the principal’s. Indeed the agent and principal might
actually be in agreement about the resolution of cases for that global
fact. If so, the principal will want to affirm any finding by the agent.
In other words, for global facts near where the principal and agent’s
preferences are in harmony, the principal always affirms, irrespective
of what the global fact suggests is the correct answer. The second
condition captures this idea.
Next if a global facts lies below

1
2

and f (x) < 1 − 2x. then the

equilibrium is identified as the solution (y ? , γ { ?) to (5) and (6). In
this range, the global fact suggests invalid is the correct answer and
the principal and agent’s preferences are in sufficient disharmony to
trigger the equilibrium where the principal mixes.
What happens if the agent prefers to find more claims invalid than
the principal? Assuming the agent follows his cutline, the principal
payoff to affirming exceeds the payoff to reversing in two cases.
x<

1
or f (x) ∈ [1 − x, 2(1 − x)].
2

The logic mirrors the prior discussion. The principal will affirm a valid
decision if
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1. The global fact provides an insufficient basis to overrule the invalid decision or
2. The principal and agent’s preferences are in sufficiently aligned.
To complete this discussion, consider what happens if the global
fact lies above

1
2

and f (x) > 2(1−x). For these claims, the equilibrium

is defined by the joint solution to (11) and (12).
The next proposition summarizes these points.
1
2 , there exists an
?
?
(∆ , g , b? ) such that:

Proposition 2. If w >
the following triple
•


1
∆? (x, y) =
0

equilibrium consisting of

if y > y ? (x)
if y ≤ y ? (x).

where



1 − 2x


y ? (x) = 2(1 − x)



f (x)

if f (x) < 1 − 2x and x <

1
2

if f (x) > 2(1 − x) and x >

1
2

otherwise.

•

?

?

γ = g (x, d) =


1



 1+2xk
1

1+2k−2kx



0

if f (x) < 1 − 2x, x <

1
2

and d = 1

if f (x) > 2(1 − x), x > 21 , and d = 0
otherwise.

• Beliefs about y are uniform with support [0, min{y ? (x), 1] if the
decision is invalid and support [max{y ? (x), 0}, 1] if the decision
is valid.
Proof. Proof follows from discussion in text.
To explain this proposition, two examples will be helpful.
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Figure 5: Agent where w =

9
10

and z =

1
2

y

y
f (x)

1

2(1 − x)

y(x) = f (x)

1 − 2x
15
29

x
5
9

Preference Conflict

Agent’s Equilibrium Strategy

Example 3 (The Formalist Agent Who Agrees About z).
Let w =

9
10

and z = 12 . Figure 5 shows the preference conflict and the

agent’s equilibrium strategy. Notice that f (x) resides between 1 − 2x
and 2(1 − x). As a result, no cases exists where f (x) < 1 − 2x and
x < 21 . Similarly, no case exists where f (x) > 2(1 − x) and x > 21 . As
a result, this agent always gets her preferred outcome.
Example 4 (The Formalist Agent Who Prefers a Lower Threshold).
Let w =

9
10

1

and z = 14 . Notice that f (x) < 2(1 − x) when x < 12 . As a

result, this agent moderates her behavior. She faces a reversal threat
for global facts between [x, 12 ] and moderates her behavior accordingly.
The preference conflict and equilibrium strategies appear in figure 6.
The examples show the difference between the formalist and antiformalist agents. It is impossible for the formalist agent to face reversal threats with respect to more than one type of decision. There
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x

Figure 6: Agent where w =

9
10

and z =

1
4
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x

Lax
z < 12

Strict
z > 12

Agree
z = 12

Anti-Formalist
w < 12

lower bound;
upper bound;
or both

lower bound;
upper bound;
or both

both upper
and lower bound

Formalist
w > 12

one bound
below 21

one bound
above 12

no constraint
on behavior

Agree
w = 21

lower bound

upper bound

No Conflict

Table 2: Equilibrium Behavior
is basic geometry behind this statement. To face reversal threats for
both valid and invalid decisions the agent’s cutline must reside below
1 − 2x for a case with global facts less than
for case with a global fact greater than

1
2.

1
2

and above 2(1 − x)

No agent with a cutline

whose slope is steeper than the principal’s can meet both these conditions. By contrast, the anti-formalist agent often does meet both
these conditions.
Taken together, proposition 1 and proposition 2 segment the parameter space into six buckets as illustrated in table 2. For each
bucket, we indicate whether the equilibrium can involve no bounds
(i.e., complete discretion), a lower bound, an upper bound, or both.
This section closes by highlighting differences between this model
and the classic signaling models in the literature. The model shares
some features with Crawford and Sobel (1982) and the costly signaling
models such as Spence (1973). Indeed, it combines elements of both
models while not perfectly tracking either.
First, in the cheap talk model, the message is costless to send. In
our model, the agent pays a penalty when her advice is ignored. The
message is no longer costless. It depends on what the principal does.
Meanwhile, in the costly signaling model, the agent always pays the
signaling cost irrespective of the the beliefs or actions of the principal.
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In our model, there is no cost to an agent sending a signal if the
principal follows the advice.
Second, in our model, the agent and principal do not disagree in
every state of the world. No matter the case draw, there will be
realizations of the local fact where the principal and agent agree on
the outcome. This stands in contrast to the cheap talk model.6
At least in the context of claim resolution, our assumptions on
bias are more plausible than the standard assumption of bias in every
state of the world. In part, the plausibility of our assumption results
from the dichotomous nature of claim resolution. It is implausible to
believe that principal and agent disagree on the resolution of every
claim; it may be plausible in the standard model which assumes a
continuous action and state space that the agent always wants more
or less of some action. But claim resolution, as done by courts, loan
officers, administrators of social security and veteran’s affairs, and
parole boards, does not seem to fall into this setting.7
Finally, and most importantly, once the principal is convinced that
the local fact lies above or below some threshold, more fine grained
information about “how” large or small y actually is does not change
the principal’s decision. In the cheap talk model, the principal always
wants to take a higher action when the state is larger. More fine
grained information, then, induces the the principal to make different
choices. This feature is noticeably absent from our model.
The last difference means that, while we might allow the agent to
send more than two messages and then construct equilibria with more
fine-grained partitions of local facts, those equilibria do not improve
the principal’s welfare. The next proposition sheds additional light on
this point.
Proposition 3. Assume the anti-formalist agent can send three distinct messages. Equilibria with three distinct messages exists. In any
of these equilibra, the principal obtains the same expected welfare as
in the two message equilibrium derived in proposition 1.
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4

Welfare and the Value of
Commitment

The ally principle from political science (Epstein and O’Halloran,
1999; Bendor et al., 2001) suggests that the principal should seek
out agents whose preference are most akin to their own. This section
reveals that that result does not extend once disagreement can occur
along multiple dimensions.
To get the intuition, contrast examples 1 and 3. In example 1, the
anti-formalist agent faces significant reversal threats. Knowing this,
she is motivated to partially decide as the principal prefers, making
fewer mistakes from the principal’s perspective in equilibrium. Example 3 is a formalist who faces no reversal threat whatsoever. Although
the formalist agent in example 3 presents a lower amount of ex ante
preference conflict with the principal, she prefers the anti-formalist
agent because that agent is easier to control and motivate.
Before proceeding to generalize this welfare result, an assumption
about the severity of the underlying preference conflict helpfully restricts the parameter values under consideration.
Assumption 1 (Limited Disagreement).
• Denote the percentage of claims over which agent and principal
have an ex ante disagreement as A. Assume that A is less than
1
4.

• The principal and agent’s preferences are such that the preference are perfectly aligned for some case within the unit interval.
Formally, xc ∈ (0, 1).
Without an agent, the principal would decide all cases with global
facts below

1
2

as invalid and all cases with global facts above

valid, resulting in an error rate of

1
4.

1
2

as

The principal can do better

than this by employing an agent. But which type? Of course, agents
might disagree more or less with the principal. As noted above, we say
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that two agents are ex ante “identical” if they would make the same
number of errors in a world where the principal lacked the power to
overrule.
Under this definition of similar agents, the principal’s program is
to select an agent – a pair (w, z) – to maximize her welfare subject to
a fixed amount of ex ante disagreement.
Facing an anti-formalist, the amount of disagreement is the sum
of the areas III and IV in figure 1. That sum is
(1 − w − z)2 + (z − w)2
.
2(1 − w)(1 − 2w)
The principal’s ex post welfare accounts for the amount of compliance
by the anti-formalist agent. For global facts in the interval [x, x], the
agent doesn’t moderate her behavior. Thus, the principal’s welfare
reflects the area of disagreement in that range.
For cases below x, the agent adopts the cutoff point y(x) = 1 − 2x.
That choice reduces the area of disagreement. For any x in this range
and y ≥ 1 − 2x the agent decides the case as valid. If the principal
reverses, she suffers a loss if y ∈ [1 − x, 1], or a loss with probability x.
If the principal affirms, she suffers a loss if y ∈ [1 − 2x, 1 − x], as such
she suffers a loss with probability x. As a result, no matter whether
she reverses or not, the principal suffers a loss of x.
Had the principal granted the agent complete autonomy, she would
have suffered a loss of (1 − x) − f (x) for cases in this interval. Given
the mitigation, she now suffers a loss of x. And so, for each global
fact, the principal’s welfare can be computed as the amount of ex ante
disagreement (1 − x) − f (x) less the benefits of mitigation (1 − 2x) −
f (x).
Proceeding this way, over the interval [0, x] the principal’s welfare
is area III less the the benefits of mitigation: the black area in figure
7.
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Figure 7: Equilibrium Mitigation
y
z
1−w

f (x)

f (x)
z−w
1−w

0

x

x
x

We get
 z

(1 − w − z)2
x
−
1 − f (x)) −
− f (x)
2(1 − w)(1 − 2w) 2
1−w
(1 − w − z)2
(1 − w − z)2
=
−
2(1 − w)(1 − 2w) 2(1 − w)(2 − 3w)
(1 − w − z)2 (2 − 3w)
(1 − w − z)2 (1 − 2w)
−
=
2(1 − w)(1 − 2w)(2 − 3w) 2(1 − w)(2 − 3w)(1 − 2w)
(1 − w − z)2
.
(13)
=
2(1 − 2w)(2 − 3w)

Area(III) − Area(Black) =

where we used that x =

1−w−z
2−3w .

For cases above x, we can do the same calculation. Subtract from
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area IV, the amount of mitigation, the red area in the figure, revealing:
Area(IV ) − Area(Red) =
=
=
=
=

 1 − x 
(z − w)2
z−w 
−
f (x) − (f (x) −
)
2(1 − 2w)(1 − w)
2
1−w
1 − x z − w
(z − w)2
−
(
)
2(1 − 2w)(1 − w)
2
1−w
(z − w)2
(z − w)2
−
2(1 − 2w)(1 − w) 2(2 − 3w)(1 − w)
(z − w)2 (2 − 3w)
(z − w)2 (1 − 2w)
−
2(1 − 2w)(1 − w)(2 − 3w) 2(2 − 3w)(1 − w)(1 − 2w)
(z − w)2
.
(14)
2(2 − 3w)(1 − 2w)

Putting (13) and (14) together, the principal’s welfare from selecting
an antiformalist agent is
W =−

(1 − w − z)2 + (z − w)2
.
2(2 − 3w)(1 − 2w)

(15)

The principal’s program maximizes (15) subject to the constraint
(1 − w − z)2 + (z − w)2
= A.
2(1 − w)(1 − 2w)
In the appendix, we derive the solution to this program. Given as1
sumption 1, the solution is (w, z) = ( 1−4A
2−4A , 2 ); this pair characterizes

the second-best optimum among anti-formalist agents.
Using the definition of xc , this agent’s cutline crosses the principal’s
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at
xc =
=
=

1−w−z
1 − 2w
1
1−4A
2 − 2−4A

1 − 2 1−4A
2−4A
 2 − 4A − 2(1 − 4A) 
2(2 − 4A)


2 − 4A
2 − 4A − 2(1 − 4A)

1
= .
2
In words, the optimal anti-formalist agent is equally likely to commit a mistaken finding of validity or a mistaken finding of invalidity.8
Inserting this agent’s cutline into the definition of welfare, we obtain
W =−

A
,
1 + 4A

The question is whether the principal can do better than this by selecting a formalist agent or an agent who disagrees solely as to the
evidence threshold. Our next proposition shows that she cannot, and
provides the central welfare result of the model.
Proposition 4.
1. Given assumption 1, the principal strictly prefers to appoint the
anti-formalist agent over an agent who disagrees in the same percentage of cases, but whose disagreement manifests as a dispute
about the evidence threshold only.
2. Given assumption 1, the principal strictly prefers to appoint the
optimal anti-formalist agent over a formalist agent who disagrees
in the same percentage of cases.
Proof. See appendix
The principal trades enhanced ex ante agency conflict for more
effective control ex post. As the anti-formalist agent becomes more
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balanced—equally likely to make either type of error—she becomes
easier to motivate. The motivation effect mitigates the agency cost
from disagreement, making the anti-formalist agent especially attractive to the principal.
An example amplifies the point. Consider the anti-formalist agent
from example 1, defined by the (w, z) = (0, 12 ) or a cutline y = 21 . Ex
ante, this agent disagrees in

1
4

of all cases. But she can be motivated

through the threat of reversal. As such, by selecting this agent, the
principal enjoys welfare of
W =−

1
4

1+1
1
=− .
8

Next consider a formalist agent defined by (w, z) = ( 34 , 12 ). Ex ante,
this agent disagrees with the principal in

1
6

of the cases. Yet, propo-

sition 2 teaches that this formalist agent faces no threat of reversal.
Thus, the principal obtains welfare of − 16 by hiring her. Even though
the formalist agent is less disagreeable at the outset, the principal
strictly prefers to appoint the anti-formalist agent.
Of course, some formalist agents will partially comply with the
principal’s wishes, as example 4 demonstrates. Inspection of figure 8
provides the logic behind the proof of the desirability of anti-formalists
over these potential alternatives. For any formalist agent, define an
equivalent anti-formalist agent. This is agent shares with the formalist
agent the same intersection point (xc ) and ex ante amount of disagreement (A). As shown in the figure, the two agents disagree in the same
fraction of cases—indeed the sum of the areas III and IV are the same.
Yet the equivalent anti-formalist agent always moderates her behavior
more (the red triangle is larger than the black triangle) and thus the
principal strictly prefers her to the formalist agent.
This section closes with a remark on the value of commitment in
claim resolution. Suppose we flipped the order of play and allowed
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Figure 8: Equivalent Formalist and Anti-Formalist Agents
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x

the principal to commit to grant authority in some cases and reverse
decisions in other cases. What would she do? Would she be better off
with this commitment power. Interestingly, no.
Proposition 5. Suppose the principal could commit to a delegation
interval. Facing the anti-formalist agent where xc ∈ [0, 1], the principal would deploy the same bounds on discretion as when she could not
commit to ex post review. Further, she would obtain the same expected
payoff.
Proof. For proof, see appendix.
Most models, for example Dessein (2002), articulate a substantial
difference between delegation and cheap talk games, between commitment and no commitment by the principal. Here, the principal suffers
loss from errors alone. He does not obtain a corresponding gain from
“correct” decisions. This difference in the utility function from the
classic models leads to the result in proposition 5.
To see why, take a case with a global fact below x. In the commitment case, the principal suffers a loss from committing to finding this
claim invalid. He makes a single type of error: a mistaken finding of
invalidity.
In the no commitment case, the anti-formalist agent partially complies. Upon seeing a valid decision, the principal suffers the same loss
from upholding the decision and reversing the decision. In expectation, the principal is equally likely to mistakenly find the claim valid
or mistakenly find the claim invalid. And thus while the type of errors shifts in the no commitment case, the total cost number of errors
remains the same.
Notably, if the principal obtained a gain of, say, 1 from any correct
decisions, then she would prefer the cheap talk setup where the threat
of reversal induces some partial compliance by the agent.

43

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3659426

5

Discussion

This section identifies key features of our model, discusses the implications they have for our results, and relates them to the most relevant
literature.
First, we assume that the principal cannot commit to a review
strategy. Typically, the inability to commit transforms delegation
games into cheap talk games. In our framework, however, the principal effectively delegates to the agent over an interval in which she
affirms the agent’s decision with probability one. And that arises even
though the principal moves after observing the resolution. The absence of commitment leads to the properties of our equilibrium: outside the interval, the principal reverses unexpected resolutions with
some probability less than one.
Second, our model permits two forms of bias: ex ante and interim.
(In the standard model with constant bias, these two measures collapse
into one but in our model they are distinct.) Ex ante bias is measured
by the percentage A of the claim space on which principal and agent
disagree. Interim bias arises after the agent and principal observe the
realization of the global fact and the agent observes the local fact.
The variation in interim bias drives our welfare results. Specifically, whether an agent is interim biased depends on the realization of
not just the global fact, but the local fact too. For some realizations,
as noted, the agent shares the principal’s preferences as to the final
resolution.
Third, we characterize formalism or anti-formalism as an inherent
trait of the agent. Some judges prefer textual to contextual evidence.
Some front-line loan officers prefer to assess an applicant more on
how she fares in the interview than the objective markers of financial
health. But this is not the only possibility. Judges, for example,
might be a formalist/textualist when to comes to contract law and
anti-formalist/contextualist in criminal law. In other words, a judge
or loan officer could have an inconsistent methodology. Instead of
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cutlines to partition the claim space, we might have step functions or
something else. After all, the weight the agent accords the evidence
might itself depend on the global fact. We might re-frame our model
to be about cases within one field of law (say contract law), but that
dodges the central issue: whether a principal would prefer an agent
who exhibit a consistent or an inconsistent philosophy as to claim
resolution. We leave that question for future work.
Related, what if the only available agents exhibit a specific kind
of method disagreement: they are either formalist or anti-formalist.
In that case, the welfare claims of the paper are less relevant, but the
equilibrium predictions of proposition 1 and 2 remain.
Finally, unlike many auditing models (Andreoni et al., 1998; Cameron
et al., 2000), here, the principal cannot pay a cost and observe, at least
with some probability, the agent’s private information. Suppose we
gave our principal that option. For each value of the global fact, she
would ask whether the likely error outweighed the cost of investigation. The principal suffers the largest error for cases with global facts
located at x and x. Thus, we suspect the principal to be most likely to
pay the cost of auditing in these cases. And, as in the conventional inspection game (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1991, p.17), the principal would
randomize between affirming and paying the cost of investigation. The
agent would modify her behavior to make this strategy optimal for the
principal. Across all global facts, we might observe the principal rely
on some combination of investigation and summary reversal of unexpected decisions to induce partial compliance by the agent.
The model most aptly applies where the principal must pay a large
cost to observe the local fact, a cost set to infinity in the model. That
makes sense, we suspect, for things like the demeanor of the witness
or whether a loan applicant appeared to be lying during an interview.
The principal can’t ‘run”’ the same interview or witness testimony
again. The principal might watch a recording, but even that is one
step removed and results in a loss of some information. By contrast,
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the principal can more easily pay an auditing cost to review paper
records or documents. Thus, our model more readily applies when
the agent observes truly soft information like demeanor, whereas prior
work applies to information that is observable, but just at an expense.

6

Conclusion

Debates between formalists and anti-formalists, textualists and contextualists, have been going in the law for awhile (Hart et al., 2012;
Baude and Doerfler, 2017). What it means to be a formalist or a contextualist has rarely been formalized or subject to a game theoretic
analysis. Our paper takes a first step in that direction. In so doing,
the model yields two types of results.
First, the two-dimensional structure complicates the ways in which
principal and agent may disagree, capturing the core jurisprudential
debate. In this framework, the principal generally defers to recommendations of the agent – but does not need to commit to do so. The
nature of the delegation depends on the nature of the disagreement
between principal and agent. Anti-formalist agents whose cutlines
intersect the principal’s cutline in the open interval (0, 1) have two
bounds on discretion. Their decisions at extreme values of the global
fact x are subject to review; consequently, the principal might overrule
holdings of both validity and invalidity. For formalist agents overruling can only occur for intermediate values of x.
Second, we show that the principal has preferences over the bias
that infects her agent. Conditional on a fixed level of ex ante disagreement, the principal prefers a anti-formalist agent to any other
similar-situated agent.
While formalism only brings costs, anti-formalism brings costs and
benefits to the principal. Anti-formalism implies that any decision will
reflect a hefty dose of private information; and private information is
valuable when the global fact is uninformative. But anti-formalism
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also implies that the agent has a tendency to disregard, or at least
underweight, the information also available to the principal. This
disregard imposes costs on the principal in those cases in which she
finds the global fact highly informative. Yet the principal can partially temper the agent’s anti-formalism in these contexts by credibly threatening, conditionally on the realized global fact, to reverse
some unexpected decisions. And this credible threat, in turn, induces
some—albeit imperfect—compliance by the anti-formalist agent. This
formalist agent, by contrast, is much harder to motivate.
Our model has several applications. Delegation is widespread in
both private and public bureaucracies. Our first result, however, has
special leverage on delegation in the public sphere. Generally, in the
public sector, the principal cannot commit to her delegation through
an enforceable contract. In public bureaucracies, this inability to commit derives from the limitations on the employment contract. In the
federal judiciary, though a hierarchy of courts exists, there are no
mechanisms of control other than affirmance and reversal of the decisions of the lower court. An appellate court, thus, cannot commit
to defer to the decisions of a lower court or an administrative agency.
Our analysis shows that, nonetheless, when the agent has private information that is valuable to her, the principal will rationally delegate
many classes of decision problems to the agent.
We conclude with two suggestions for future work. First, the model
assumes that the two facts are independently distributed. The principal doesn’t learn anything about the location of the local fact from the
realization of the global fact. If the two facts were perfectly correlated,
of course, the principal would not need the agent at all. Partial correlation might allow the principal to do better by improving the amount
of partial compliance by the agent. But, we suspect, the driving force
behind the desirability of anti-formalist agents would remain.
Unlike the formalist, the anti-formalist agent disagrees as to what
claims should be found valid in cases where the global fact points
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towards invalidity, making threats of reversal credible. The independence of the draws does not dictate the economic insight. Instead, the
driving force is that anti-formalist agents have cutlines with a flatter
slope than the principal while formalists have cutlines with a steeper
slope.
Second, the model ignores the decision whether to file a claim in
the first place. In the context of litigation, the plaintiff might not file
if she knows, say, that a finding of liability is unlikely to arise. This
changes the kinds of cases the principal and agent potentially consider,
which, in turn, would surely change the equilibrium strategies.

7
A.

Appendix

Uninformative Equilibria

There are two ways in which the agent’s decision might fail to convey
information about the local fact. First, irrespective of type, the agent
might, for example, send the message “valid” and “invalid” with equal
probability. Alternatively, the agent might pool on the expected message, the message which accords with the global fact. We consider
each type of uninformative equilibria in turn.
First, suppose d =

1
2

for all (x, y). In that case, the principal’s

beliefs about y remain uniform with support [0, 1] for all cases and all
agent decisions. And so, the principal’s best response is



1


γ ? = g ? (x, d) = 1



0

if x <

1
2

and d = 1

if x >

1
2

and d = 0

otherwise.

Take the agent where y = 1 who observes a global fact above 12 . If she
follows this babbling strategy, her expected payoff is − 12 . By contrast,
her payoff to sending the valid message is 0. This agent type thus has
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a profitable deviation, meaning this equilibrium cannot exist.
Second, let us examine a pooling equilibrium. In this equilibrium,
the agent decides on the basis of the global fact alone. If the global
fact exceeds 12 , she finds valid; if it is less than 21 , the agent decides
invalid.
Take a case where x > 12 . Suppose the agent decides the claim as
valid. Off the equilibrium path, the principal believes that the message
“invalid” is equally likely to come from any agent type. Given the
agent’s behavior and the principal’s beliefs, the principal affirms the
valid decision and reverses the invalid decision. No agent type wants
to deviate and incur the cost of reversal. The pooling equilibrium
therefore exists. The issue is whether the principal’s beliefs supporting
this equilibrium are plausible. We next demonstrate that the beliefs
fail to be “universally divine” as defined by Banks and Sobel (1987).
First, for agents where y > f (x), the decision “valid” provides a
higher payoff than the decision “invalid” irrespective of whether the
principal affirms or reverses the invalid decision. Her equilibrium payoff is 0. If this agent type reports “invalid” either (a) the principal
reverses and the agent suffers a reversal cost or (b) the principal affirms the invalid decision and this agent suffers from a mistaken final
resolution. Thus, any equilibrium cannot have the principal believe
the invalid message came from a type in the interval y ∈ [f (x), 1].
For the remaining types, define γ(y) as the probability of reversal
of an invalid decision such that the agent who draws y is indifferent
between sending the message valid and invalid; that is, γ(y)(1 + ky) =
1 or γ(y) =

1
1+ky .

Following the proof in Reinganum and Wilde (1986) observe that
γ(y) is maximized at y = 0. Thus, the agent who draws y = 0 is most
likely to deviate from sending the message valid (that is, she deviates
for the most values of γ(y)). Universal divinity therefore demands the
principal believe that the invalid message came from this agent, the
one who drew y = 0. Given those beliefs, the principal wants to affirm
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the invalid decision. Anticipating this affirmance, any agent who drew
a y < f (x) would prefer to deviate and send the invalid message rather
than pool on the valid message. And so, the pooling equilibrium fails
to be universally divine.

B.

Alternative Payoff Function

This subsection shows that the equilibrium described in proposition
(1) is robust to a specification of preferences where the reversal cost
does not vary with the local fact. Define the utility of the principal as
Up (x, y, r) = −r(1 − x − y)1y<1−x − (1 − r)(1 − 1y<1−x )(y − (1 − x)).
Define the utility of the agent as
Ua (x, y, r, d, γ) = −r1y<f (x) (f (x)−y))−(1−r)(1−1y<f (x) )(y−f (x))−γk.
where k is a constant. With these utility functions, the players suffer
greater disutility when the mistake in the resolution is big rather than
small. Further, the agent suffers a fixed cost of reversal, which is
independent of her type.
Assume that w < 21 . With these utility functions, expressions (1)
and (2) become
R 1−x
−

max{0,f (x)} (1

− x − y)dy

pr(valid)

And

R1
−

1−x (y

= −min{

− (1 − x))dy

pr(valid)

(1 − x)2 (1 − x − f (x))2
,
}.
2pr(valid)
2pr(valid)

=−

x2
.
2pr(valid)

The principal will affirm any valid decision if x > x where x solves
−min{

(1 − x)2 (1 − x − f (x))2
x2
,
}+
= 0.
2pr(valid)
2pr(valid)
pr(valid)
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The solution is x = min{ 12 , 1−w−z
2−3w }, which is the same as (4). For
claims less than x. the equilibrium is defined as the joint solution to
an equation making the principal indifferent between reversing and
affirming a valid decision and an equation ensuring that the reversal
probability induces that behavior by the agent. That is,
R 1−x
−

y?

(1 − x − y)dy

pr(valid)

R1
+

1−x (y

− (1 − x)dy

pr(valid

= 0.

And
−(y − f (x)) + γ × (y − f (x) + k) = 0
The principal’s mixing condition reduces to
−

(1 − x − y ? )2
x2
+
= 0.
2pr(valid)
2pr(valid)

Considering only values of y ? < 1, the equation admits the positive
solution:
y ? = 1 − 2x.
Using this, the reversal probability is
γ? =

1 − 2x − f (x)
.
1 − 2x − f (x) + k

Turn next to invalid decisions. The principal’s payoff from affirming
is

R min{1,f (x)}
−

1−x

(y − (1 − x))dy

pr(invalid

.

(16)

while the payoff to reversing is
R 1−x
−

0

(1 − x − y)dy
.
pr(invalid)

(17)

The global fact where (16) equals (17) defines x. Doing the integration
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and solving, we get
1 2 − z − 2w
x = max{ ,
}.
2
2 − 3w
For cases where x > x, the principal must be willing to mix between
affirming and reversing an invalid decisio given the agent plays y ? .
Thus,
R y?

1−x (y

− (1 − x))dy

R 1−x

(1 − x − y)dy
pr(invalid
pr(invalid)
?
2
(y − (1 − x))
(1 − x)2
=−
+
2pr(invalid)
2pr(invalid)

0=−

+

0

from which we derive the positive solution y ? = 2(1 − x). Meanwhile,
for the agent to prefer the cutoff point y ? demands that reversal probability make her indifferent at that value. That is,
(f (x) − y ? ) − γ × (f (x) − y ? + k) = 0
or,
γ? =

f (x) − 2(1 − x)
.
f (x) − 2(1 − x) + k

And thus, we see that the results from proposition 1 are robust to
alternative specifications of the utility functions.

C.

Proof of Proposition 3

In this proof, we construct a three partition equilibrium for global facts
between [0, xc ]. The proof for global facts between [xc , 1] is similar.
Consider first a global fact in the interval [x, xc ]. Partition the
space of local facts into three intervals, defined by [0, y1 ], [y1 , y2 ] and
[y2 , 1]. Suppose the agent sends message invalid1 for local facts in the
first interval; invalid2 for local facts in the second interval and valid
for local facts in the third interval. Set y2 = f (x). These messages
induce uniformly distributed beliefs by the principal with the support
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defined by the length of each interval. And so, the principal will find
the claim invalid when she sees invalid1 or invalid2 . She will also
affirm and find the claim valid when she sees the valid message since
x ∈ [x, xc ]. In equilibrium, the principal suffers the same loss as with
just two messages; that is, 1 − x − f (x).
Consider next a global fact where x < x. Again, partition the
space of local facts into three intervals. [0, y1 ], [y1 , y2 ] and [y2 , 1]. Let
y2 = 1 − 2x. Again, take three messages: (1) invalid1 ; (2) invalid2 ;
and (3) valid. Given the y2 , the principal is willing to mix between
reversing and not following a valid message (i.e., issuing a final ruling
of valid or invalid). Suppose she mixes with γ ? =

1
1+2kx .

Given her

beliefs, the principal finds the claim invalid if she observes invalid1 or
invalid2 .
No agent who draws a local fact in first interval has an incentive to
deviate. If she reports invalid2 , the principal finds the claim invalid,
which does not improve her payoff. If the agent deviates and reports
valid, the principal reverses with probability γ ? , leading to a payoff of
−γ ? (1 + k(1 − y)).
which is less than −1 for all y < 1 − 2x. The same analysis applies
for agents who draw a local fact in the second interval. Finally, no
agent who draws a local fact in the interval between [1 − 2x, 1] has an
incentive to deviate. If they do, the principal will resolve the claim as
invalid, leading to a lower payoff.
This three partition equilibrium provides the exact same expected
payoff for the principal as the two step partition derived in proposition
1. The principal suffers a loss, in expectation, of x, for global facts in
the range [0, x).
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D.

Solution to Constrained Optimization Prob-

lem
Recall that the principal maximizes
W =−

(1 − w − z)2 + (z − w)2
.
2(2 − 3w)(1 − 2w)

(18)

subject to
(1 − w − z)2 + (z − w)2
− A = 0.
2(1 − w)(1 − 2w)
The ex ante disagreement constraint can be expressed as
(1 − w − z)2 + (z − w)2 = 2A(1 − w)(1 − 2w).

(19)

Substitute the RHS of (19) into the numerator of (18). Doing so eliminates z and transforms the constrained problem into an unconstrained
one. Some cancellations reveal the principal’s program as
max −
w

A(1 − w)
,
2 − 3w

Figure 9 is the graph of W (w) where A =

(20)
1
4.

It shows that W

decreases with w. All else equal, the principal prefers to set w = 0.
Yet any solution must ultimately involve a real number for z. To
account for this fact, solve the constraint for z.
z=

1±

√

8Aw2 − 4w2 + 4w − 12Aw + 4A − 1
2

(21)

To ensure z is real, the expression under the square root must be
positive, or
8Aw2 − 4w2 + 4w − 12Aw + 4A − 1 ≥ 0
The LHS of (22) has two roots: w =

1−4A
2−4A

and

1
2.

(22)
Further, the

expression is only positive for values of w in the interval [w, 12 ]. Finally,
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Figure 9: Graph of W (w)
W (w)

0

1
2

1
8

notice that w is positive if A <

1
4

x

and negative if A > 41 . In short, the

values of w where the expression under the square root is (strictly)
positive includes 0 when A exceeds 14 . Otherwise it does not.
Because the principal’s welfare decreases in w, she wants w to be
as small as possible. The assumption of limited disagreement means
that A <

1
4.

Thus, the smallest available selection for w is w > 0.

At this value, we also have that xc =

1−w−x
1−2w

∈ (0, 1) as required by

assumption 1.
On the other hand, if A ≥ 14 , the principal is free to set w = 0.
Finally, if the solution to the problem involves setting w = w then
by (21), we get z = 12 . If the solution is w = 0 then by (21) we have
z=

√
1± 4A−1
.
2
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E.

Proof of Proposition 4

i.

Part 1

Using the optimal anti-formalist agent, the principal’s welfare is
W ? (A) = −

A
.
1 + 4A

Consider an agent who is lax, but agrees about method (w = 12 , z < 12 )
(The proof for the strict agent is similar). The area of disagreement
between the principal and this agent is
1 (2z)2
−
2
2
Set this area equal to A and solve the constraint for z.
√
z(A) =

1 − 2A
.
2

(23)

Observe that z(A) decreases in A. Further, at A = 14 , equation (23)
√

provides z =

2
4 .

We next use the assumption about the extent of

disagreement to restrict the parameters (w, z) under consideration,
Assumption 1 restricts attention to A ≤
√

examine values of z in the interval [

1
4.

And thus, we only

2 1
4 , 2 ].

Recall that x is
x = min

n1 1 − w − z o
,
.
2 2 − 3w

We assume that this agent agrees with the principal as to the threshold; that is, w = 21 . Plugging in w =
1−

2z.9

1
2

into x yields a lower bound of

Facing this agent, the principal’s welfare is the ex ante area
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of disagreement less the area of mitigation, or

x(1 − 2z) 
Wt (A) = − A −
2

(1 − 2z)2 
=− A−
.
2

(24)

Plug the value of z from (23) into (24). Doing so, we get
Wt (A) = (1 − 2A) −

√

1 − 2A

A
which is less than W ? (A) = − 1+4A
for all A ∈ (0, 14 ].

ii.

Part 2

Start with a formalist agent who disagrees in A cases and does not face
a reversal threat. The principal’s payoff from employing this agent is
−A, which is less than W ? (A).
Next recall that the formalist agent can never face a reversal threat
for both valid and invalid decisions. Picking one, we focus on a formalist agent who faces a reversal threat for some valid decisions, and
therefore partially complies where she prefers valid and the principal
prefers invalid.
Our first step is to show that we only need to consider formalist
agents where w ∈ ( 43 , 1] and z ∈ [0, 12 ] given our assumptions.
First, assumption 1 restricts attention to xc =

w+z−1
2w−1

∈ (0, 1).

This implies
z >1−w

(25)

z < 2w + 1

(26)

For the formalist agent to moderate her behavior with respect to validity requires
f (x) < 1 − 2x
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(27)

for a value of x ∈ [0, 12 ]. Solving (27) as an equality gives
x=
Note that (28) is less than

1
2

z+w−1
3w − 2

(28)

when
z<

w
.
2

(29)

Combining the inequalities (25) and (29) yields
1−w <z <

w
,
2

Ensuring that a z exists in this range restricts the formalist agents
under consideration: it must be that w > 23 .
Given the analysis thus far and the attention on formalist agents
who face reversal threats as to valid decisions, the remainder of the
proof only considers agents where w >

2
3

and z < 12 . Such an agent

partially complies for cases with global facts in the interval [x, 12 ].
This formalist agent ex ante disagrees in the following percentage
of cases.

(z + w − 1)2 + (w − z)2
.
2(2w − 1)w

The principal’s welfare from hiring this agent is the ex ante disagreement less than benefits of mitigation.
Wf (w, z) = −A +

(w − 2z)2
.
4w(3w − 2)

Define an “equivalent” anti-formalist agent by the pair (w̃, z̃), where
w̃ = 1 − w
z̃ = 1 − z
The disagreement area associated with the equivalent anti-formalist
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agent is
(1 − w̃ − z̃)2 + (z̃ − w̃)2
2(1 − w̃)(1 − 2w̃)
(z + w − 1)2 + (w − z)2
=
,
2w(2w − 1)

A=

which is the same as the formalist agent. Likewise, the point at which
the cutlines cross is
1 − w̃ − z̃
1 − 2w̃
w+z−1
=
,
2w − 1

xc =

which is the same as the formalist agent.
The next step is to show that the principal achieves a higher welfare from employing the “equivalent” anti-formalist agent than the
formalist counter-part. As a result, among similarly situated agents—
those that disagree in A cases—the principal can always do better by
hiring the equivalent anti-formalist.
The welfare associated with hiring the equivalent anti-formalist
agent is
(z̃ − w̃)2
(1 − w̃ − z̃)2
+
2(1 − w̃)(2 − 3w̃) 2(2 − 3w̃)(1 − w̃)
(w + z − 1)2
(w − z)2
= −A +
+
.
2w(3w − 1)
2w(3w − 1)

We (w̃, z̃) = −A +

Observe that We (w̃, z̃) > Wf (w, z) if
(w − z)2
(w − 2z)2
>
.
2w(3w − 1)
4w(3w − 2)
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Figure 10: Graph of D(w, z) where z =

1
4

D(w, 14 )

ŵ
0

2
3

1

w

Let the difference between these expressions be
(w − 2z)2
(w − z)2
−
2w(3w − 1) 4w(3w − 2)
3w2 − 3w − 6z 2 + 4z
=
4 (3w − 1) (3w − 2)

D(w, z) =

Observe in figure 10 that over the relevant range of w, D(w, z)
increases with w. Moreover, the function equals zero at
ŵ(z) =

3+

√

9 − 48z + 72z 2
6

We next show that D(w, z) must always be positive. That amounts
to showing that w > ŵ.
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Define
G(z)1 − z − ŵ(z)
H(z)2z − ŵ(z)
Recognizing a few facts about G(z) and H(z) finishes the proof.
1. G(0) = 0, G( 13 ) = 0.
2. We have
4 − 12z
−1
G0 (z) = √
9 − 48z + 72z 2
4
√
G00 (z) = −
<0
2
(24z − 16z + 3) 9 − 48z + 72z 2
Using the above expressions, notice that G(z) has a single critical
point at z = .21, which is the maximum. Combined with the
facts that G(0) = 0 and G( 13 ) = 0 observe that G(z) > 0 when
z ∈ (0, 31 ).
3. H( 13 ) = 0, H( 12 ) =

1
2

−

√
3
3

>0

4−12z
4. We also have that H 0 (z) = 2 + √9−48z+72z
> 0 over the relevant
2

range of z. As a result H(z) ≥ 0 if z ∈ ( 13 , 12 ].
To satisfy restriction (25) demands that w > 1 − z. It follows that
w − ŵ > 1 − z − ŵ = G(z) ≥ 0.
Since (a) w is greater ŵ and (b) D(w, z) is positive when w > ŵ, we
get D(w, z) > 0 when the agent’s cutline is defined by w ∈ ( 23 , 1] and
z ∈ [0, 31 ].
We next have one last formalist agent to consider. This agent’s
cutline is defined by w ∈ ( 23 , 1] and z ∈ ( 13 , 12 ].
Restriction (29) requires that w > 2z. It follows that
w − ŵ > 2z − ŵ = H(z) ≥ 0.

61

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3659426

Therefore w > ŵ and D(w, z) > 0 in this case.
To close, because D(w, z) > 0 for all formalist agents whose preferences are consistent with assumption 1, it follows that We (w̃, z̃) >
Wf (w, z). And, of course, W ? (A) > We (w̃, z̃), completing the proof.

F.

Proof of Proposition 5

Facing an anti-formalist agent, the principal who can commit selects
a lower bound, x and an upper bound x to maximize

nZ
W =−
0

x

xdx+
Z xc
(1 − x − (
Z

x
x

(
xc

z
wx
−
dx+
1−w 1−w

z
wx
−
− (1 − x))dx+
1−w 1−w
Z

1

o
(1 − x)dx .

x

The solution is familiar. It is x =

1−w−z
2−3w

and x =

2−2w−z
2−3w .

Moreover,

the value of the objective function is the same as without commitment.
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Notes
1

Amoco Prod. Co. v. EM Nominee P’ship Co., 2 P.3d 534, 540 (Wyo.
2000).
2
Likewise, disagreement along a single dimension defines the tax compliance literature (Andreoni et al., 1998). In these models, the taxpayer always
prefers to report less rather than more income, an assumption we relax in
our paper.
3
For notational simplicity, we assume that the loss from reversal is independent of x. The appendix shows that the equilibrium analysis remains
the same if (1) the agent and principal’s losses from mistaken adjudication
linearly increases with the size of the error and (2) the agent suffers a fixed
cost of reversal.
4
The appendix discusses equilibria where the agent’s decision is unrelated
to the location of the local fact and thus uninformative. If they exist, these
equilibria fail the “universal divinity” refinement of Banks and Sobel (1987).
5
As an example, take an agent whose cutline is f (x) = −x. This agent
prefers to find all claims valid. If the principal observes a valid resolution
from this agent, the principal’s beliefs do not change as to the local facts
that might give rise to that decision. It could be any local fact.
6
To see that consider the leading example from Crawford and Sobel
(1982). The preferences are given by
Up = −(a − y)2
Ua = −(a − y − b)2
where y is the state of the world known only by the agent, a is the action the
principal takes and b is the agent’s bias. For all y, the agent and principal
disagree about the action.
7
Recall that, in our setting, the agent (and the principal) are resolving
claims, not announcing policy. So while it might be, for instance, that an
agent always prefers a more claimant-favorable policy than the principal,
they may still agree about the resolution of specific claims.
8
The result of preferring an agent who commits equal errors, we suspect,
is a product of the principal’s cutline being a 45 degree line.
√
9
We know that 1 − 2z < 21 since z > 42 > 14 .
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